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Introduction 
The Netherlands i  a country physically structured by water. In addition 
to many minor rivers and canals, three large European rivers--the Meuse, 
the Scheldt and the Rhine--meander their way through the country to- 
wards the North Sea. A flat topography mostly at or below sea level is 
combined with a relatively high population density and wealth. It is hardly 
surprising, then, that the Netherlands have long been prominent in the 
development of water-related technologies, ranging from massively ap- 
plied land reclamation (starting in the Middle Ages) and the adaptation of
windmill technology for drainage (since the 15 th century) to the develop- 
ment of the world's largest seaport in Rotterdam and several large scale 
damming projects (the Zuiderzee; the Rhine, Meuse and Scheldt estuar- 
ies) in the 20 th century. 
In this paper, however, we will not focus on isolated feats in the interna- 
tional history of technology. What makes the history of Dutch water man- 
agement truly interesting is the complex adjudication ofvery different and 
potentially conflicting social interests in water flows. For in this intensively 
cultivated country, the same bodies of water might be subject o flood pro- 
tection measures, land reclamation, inland navigation, fresh water supply 
for agriculture, industry and cities, waste water disposal, recreation, fish- 
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ing and even military defense (the last"water defense line"was constructed 
during the Cold War). 
We shall focus upon the accommodation f these different social inter- 
ests in the practice of water management aswell as in technical design. For 
this purpose we shall draw from the analytical framework of large technical 
systems that has been developed in the sociology and history of technology 
over the last two decades. For a general introduction to this framework we 
refer to the introduction to this volume.' Here we shall only observe that it 
suits our research interests because it is explicitly designed to study the 
messy sociotechnical complexity of infrastructural technologies. As a re- 
search topic, it inspires the analysis of the shaping of individual hydraulic 
artifacts not as a goal in itself, but as related to the performance of large 
and possibly nation-wide or even transnational infrastructural systems-- 
for navigation, drainage, water supply or defense. And as a research meth- 
odology, its lead concept of"system building"draws attention to the process 
in which certain historical actors (the "system builders") manipulate and 
juxtapose heterogeneous (technical as well as non-technical) elements into 
one sociotechnical whole. This concept combines everal important vir- 
tues. Its immanently multidisciplinary character (system builders constantly 
cross disciplinary borders), exposing the multiple interrelations between 
the social and the technical, makes it a welcome addition to existing stud- 
ies of Dutch water management from technological, economical and insti- 
tutional perspectives. 2 Furthermore, it opens the analysis for actors and 
actor processes that are so often lacking in studies of systems and struc- 
tures. Most of all, a focus upon system building as an actor-process may 
show how different social interests were balanced and eventually accom- 
modated in the actual design. 
This last issue, however, demands a slight adjustment of the research 
focus. LTS-studies originally studied the perceptions, problems and actions 
of individual system builders, providing new insights into the construction 
and management of systems 3 but-- inasmuch as they were concerned with 
great men pursuing their projects--less sensitive to uncovering conflicts 
between actors and their impacts on technical design. * LTS scholars who 
have extended the notion of system building from individuals to large or- 
ganizations or even "institutional frameworks,""institutional regimes" or 
"governance structures" (involving actors, institutional structures, and rules 
of system building) have, in our opinion, paid insufficient attention to this 
matter, s Even Kaijser's study of the institutional frameworks of early 
water control systems, to which this study is much indebted, largely 
ignores other uses of water which might interfere with water control, 
and therefore pays insufficient attention to the high conflict potential 
that makes wet system building so complex. 6 In this paper, we shall 
use the concept of 'regime of wet system building'to denote a historically 
specific onstellation of actors representing different uses of water. In other 
words, these regimes reflect and define how and which social interests in 
water are accommodated into the system-building process and ultimately 
into the technical designs. 
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The first section of this paper distinguishes four regimes of wet system 
building from the Middle Ages to the present, which accommodated po- 
tentially conflicting social interests in water flows in radically different ways. 
The second section zooms in on the regime that dominated most of the 
20 th century, and studies the delicate politics of technical design at the mi- 
cro level of two selected cases: the canalization of the river Meuse in the 
1920s (a"link'in the wet network) and the construction of the Haringvliet 
locks in the Southwestern delta after the Second World War (a crucial"net- 
work-node"). Both cases bring out the complex interplay between the va- 
riety of social interests and the design process, which is a particular feature 
of the construction of water-based large technical systems as compared to 
other types of infrastructural technologies. 
Balancing interests in regimes for wet system building: 
A long term view 
The settler-village r gime and the origins of Dutch wate r management 
Prior to 800 A.D. in the region that was later to become the Netherlands, 
humans had primarily adapted"passively"to the water situation. They simply 
chose to live on higher ground. If they colonized swampy areas, they situ- 
ated their farms or villages on grounds that were gradually heightened 
with clay and manure (so-called terpen). 7 The first institution to actively 
embark on wet system building was the settler village, which developed 
and flourished between the 9 th to the 13 th centuries. Groups of settlers 
drained peat bogs, which constituted a very large part of the territory, by 
digging systems of parallel ditches, creating fertile agricultural land that 
provided the basis for villages. Historians distinguish two types of recla- 
mation settlements. In the 9 th and 10 th centuries and primarily in the North- 
ern regions, reclamation initiatives were framed by the councils of the 
egalitarian Frisian villages. By contrast, in the Western and Central regions 
a feudal structure developed, and in the 11 th and 12 th centuries the feudal 
lords founded new settler villages in a successful attempt o imitate the 
Frisian reclamation projects. Reclaimers were offered a degree of personal 
freedom in return for paying taxes and serving as soldiers in times of war. 
But even here the village council, in addition to other tasks, bore the brunt 
of coordinating the building of canal systems for drainage. 
The impact on landscapes was enormous. Extensive tracts of peat bog 
were transformed into fertile agricultural land. On the other hand, an un- 
intended effect of reclamation was the lowering of ground level (by several 
meters within a couple of centuries) due to oxidation and decomposition 
of the peat after drainage. Much of the land became vulnerable to floods, 
which caused a perforation of the coastal ine and the shaping of large 
inner seas and lakes, in short a large loss of of land. As a response to in- 
creasing flood threats, humans developed a range of water control tech- 
nologies. The capacity of drainage canals was increased, and villages took 
on the construction of dikes. Originally erected around individual villages, 
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in the 12 th and 13 th centuries dikes were joined together to form long unin- 
terrupted chains along the coasts and rivers. In the feudal areas, the neces- 
sary coordination between villages was provided by the feudal ords. In the 
North, the Frisians invented regional organizations (called ambachten) for 
this purpose. Still, coordination was organized on a geographical basis: 
each village was responsible for the part of the dike in its vicinity. In his 
above-mentioned study of early institutional regimes for water control, 
Kaijser therefore concludes that the building of dikes was integrated into 
the existing institutional framework of the village. 8Within the village, ev- 
ery landowner had responsibility for a part of the dike and the drainage 
system. The village council organized inspections. 
Obviously even in these early days water was used in various ways. Fish- 
ing had been an important activity for centuries, and the beginnings of an 
inland navigation system had emerged as early as the 10 th century: The 
Frisian counties were among the few areas in Europe with a money 
economy, navigating the North Sea as well as the Rhine (which they ac- 
cessed via its northern delta system), and constituted a trade link be- 
tween the Byzantine and Frankish empires. Information about possible 
conflicts between different uses of water is scarce, but it is important to note 
that these different uses of water were often united in the same users. AsVan 
de Ven observes,"people w re farmers, sailors and tradesmen all in one. "9 
Also, the village councils--as institutions for the common weal--were well- 
suited to balancing different interests. Co-ordination between functions was 
thus a matter of the individual or the local village council, and the repre- 
sentation of different water uses not yet clearly differentiated. 
A preindustrial regime for wet system building 
In subsequent centuries uch a differentiation did take place, starting 
with the emergence of specialized bodies for water control, later known as 
water boards (waterschappen). Today these still constitute a local level of gov- 
ernment next to municipalities. From the late 12 th century onwards, the feudal 
lords in the principalities of Holland and Utrecht founded large regional water 
boards in order to build dams with discharge sluices in river mouths or canals. 
These prevented the intrusion of (salt) water during high tides while allowing 
for drainage at low tides. Serving perhaps ome twenty villages, these dams 
challenged the capabilities of the existing institutional framework. 1~ Emerg- 
ing also in the North, these regional institutions later acquired other esponsi- 
bilities such as organizing dike and canal inspections, resolving conflicts among 
villages and imposing fines. In the 15 th century, such specialized water boards 
began to emerge at the local level as well and a framework emerged in which 
local boards were responsible for local water control systems, and regional 
boards for the major canals (so-called boezems) carrying of the water from these 
local systems. Inasmuch as the large landowners dominated these water boards, 
drainage, and the associated agricultural yields, was prioritized as the most 
important function of water management. Other, conflicting uses such as 
fishing and navigation (obstructed by dams) had to yield. 
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These other interests were represented atleast in part by different insti- 
tutions, which tended to build their own systems. For instance, the power- 
ful and nearly autonomous cities managed to create xtended networks for 
inland navigation51 Particularly after the crisis of the Dutch revolt had 
passed in the 1580s, the rapidly expanding cities organized regular freight 
and passenger t ansport, appointing skippers to sail according to fixed time 
schedules. By the mid 17 th century the interurban transportation system 
included every city of any importance. In addition, from the early 17 th cen- 
tury so-called market boat services were established between cities and 
their rural hinterlands. Finally, between the 1630s and 1660s the cities built 
a separate canal network to accommodate"rapid"passenger trafficby horse- 
drawn barges. This"pre-industrial mass transportation network"included 
some 650 kilometers of canals connecting some 30 cities, and was respon- 
sible for more than a million trips a year32 
The Republic's military authority was yet another wet system builder, in 
possession of a system for rapid strategic inundations of the countryside 
for the purpose of national defense. This technology had been pioneered 
during the Dutch Revolt in the 1570s, where it was responsible for break- 
ing the lengthy and nearly successful Spanish sieges of Leiden and Alkmaar. 
The surroundings were inundated by blowing up strategic dike segments, 
and the Spanish ad to abandon their positions and flee to higher ground. 
After the improvised flooding of many connected polders to create a long 
water defense line that actually stopped Louis XIV's mighty army before it 
reached the military and commercial gravity center of the Republic, this mili- 
tary technique began to be"engraved" in the Dutch waterway system in the 
form of a number of permanent water defense lines. This involved the con- 
stmction of strategically placed inundation sluices, and of special fortresses 
to protect he remaining transport routes, the higher oads and dikes. 13 
Fourth, rich urban merchants in search of profitable investments initi- 
ated a new wave of land reclamations. They founded joint-stock ventures 
to finance large reclamation projects making extensive use of windmill tech- 
nology. The newly reclaimed land could subsequently be rented or sold at 
a profit. In the case of the large Beemster Lake (7000 hectares) near 
Amsterdam, over a hundred investors were involved in a project involving 
forty-three windmills. In the 16 th and 17 th centuries more than 150,000 hect- 
ares of arable land were reclaimed. TM 
Finally, the provinces that together constituted the Republic might oc- 
casionally carry out water works of their own, for example, assuming re- 
sponsibility for the large rivers. A major achievement was the stabilization 
of the division of Rhine water over its major branches in the mid 18 th cen-  
tury, a feat made possible by cooperation between Provincial authorities 
(but after considerable disagreement and strong external pressure from 
Prussia which demanded a navigable Rhine).15 
Thus, mirroring the decentralized structure of the Dutch Republic, a re- 
gime for"parallel" wet system building had emerged characterized by a 
number of system builders independently building wet systems for spe- 
cific functions. These were of course physically connected by water and 
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affected each other. But coordination remained minimal. It has been ob- 
served that co-operation between cities and water boards was poor; before 
the introduction of a separate canal network, there had been many con- 
flicts around the generally irreconcilable combination of drainage, dam- 
ming and navigation. 16Likewise, there was almost no cooperation between 
water boards and military authorities. 17The state authorities hardly antici- 
pated conflicts between different system builders. At most they responded 
through the legal system once conflicts had arisen. 
Rijkswaterstaat nd the creation of a centralized regime 
In the centralized state that succeeded the decentralized Republic in the 
last decade of the 18 th century, water management was seen as a task to be 
managed by the national government. Gradually, the preindustrial regime 
of parallel system building gave way to a regime of centrally coordinated 
system building. To support the authorities, a national engineering corps 
was created in 1798 to initiate and manage waterworks of national impor- 
tance, and to supervise all hydraulic activities at lower levels. It has sur- 
vived to this day under the name of State Water Service (Rijkswaterstaat) 
and is at present he main executive ngineering agency of the Ministry of 
Transport and Water Management. 18 
With the advent of the Rijkswaterstaat, the task of juggling various inter- 
ests and associated wet systems fell to the responsible Minister, his techni- 
cal advisors, and, later, Parliament. To start with, the central state took over 
the construction of a range of wet systems--under the proviso that they be 
of national interest. In practice, the apportioning of responsibilities and 
priorities varied over time. In the 19 th century, the state focused upon the 
"improvement"of the large rivers by constructing three new river mouths, 
upgrading river dikes, and normalizing hundreds of kilometers of river. In 
addition, the state reclaimed several large lakes in the province of Holland, 
which threatened to transform the central region between Rotterdam and 
Amsterdam into one vast unmanageable body of water. Finally, the national 
state constructed some 800 kms of canals to create a new navigational infra- 
structure succeeding the above-mentioned barge networks .  19 In the 20 th cen-  
tury  the improvement ofcoastal flood defenses claimed priority. In the course 
of that century the total length of coastline was reduced from some 3400 kms 
to some 650 km, thanks primarily to the closing off of the Zuiderzee, a large 
inland sea, in 1932 and to the damming up of the estuarine river mouths in 
the Southwestern delta after World War II. Finally, between 1940 and 1970 
the Rijkswaterstaat created anation-wide system for the distribution of fresh 
water to cities, agriculture and industry across the country. R~ 
Being responsible for a variety of social interests, the state faced mul- 
tiple demands in the construction of concrete water works. For instance, 
river improvement was aimed simultaneously at improving the drainage 
capacity and the navigability of rivers. Likewise, the damming of the 
Zuiderzee was motivated by an immediate political need to ward off future 
floods as well as concerns for improved infrastructural connections (the 
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dam carries a road), reclamation of new arable land yielding long-term 
economic gains, the creation of a large freshwater"cachement'to improve 
drainage and irrigation of the Northern provinces, and the short-term na- 
tional interest in countering massive unemployment. In the case of the 
post-war construction of a nation-wide flesh water supply system, seem- 
ingly incompatible interests were ultimately combined: the final design 
allowed the navigability of different stretches of river, fresh water supply 
to the North (the city of Amsterdam and the agriculture of three provinces) 
and to the West (the city of Rotterdam and the intensive greenhouse agri- 
culture of the Westland), the disposal of sewage from the large cities, as 
well as the reclamation of new land. 21 
Two observations about this centralized regime for wet system building 
are apposite. First, in addition to conflicting interests on the national level 
there remained many tensions between ational interests and regional or 
local levels. The Rijkswaterstaat exercised its supervision mainly through 
negotiation, leaving much autonomy to the provinces and local and dis- 
trict water boards. Even after a truly hierarchical relationship was enacted 
by law in the early 20 th century, lower authorities retained considerable 
autonomy and countervailing power. 22 
Second, even within this centralized regime one may distinguish several 
styles of wet system building. Lintsen has divided the history of the 
Rijkswaterstaat into an"aristocratic-artisanal period" during the reign of 
the enlightened espot King William I, succeeded by a"democratic-me- 
chanical period" in which Ministers were responsible to Parliament and 
steam-power enabled large scale works. By the 1930s a"technocratic-sci- 
entific period"had set in, marked by a scientific approach to hydraulic en- 
gineering, and relatively powerless Ministers and Parliament. 23The 
adjudication of"wet" interests occurred mainly within the civil service or- 
ganization, which translated political issues into technical problems and 
designed solutions. When these were offered to politicians for debate and 
decisions, the important choices had implicitly already been made. Accord- 
ing to another historian, and many critics, the Rijkswaterstaat had become 
"a state within a state. "24 
Towards apost-modern egime of wet system building 
The historian Thomas Hughes has observed a crisis in large technical 
system building in the United States starting in the late 1960s. With the 
emergence of the counterculture and the delegitimization f military sys- 
tems in the Vietnam war, technocratic system building encountered such 
massive popular opposition that certain planners believed that the days of 
large-scale system building were numbered. However, out of this crisis 
emerged anew style of system building, inspired on a form of participative 
management congenial to the values of the counterculture and the social, 
political and environmental complexity of postindustrial societies. Con- 
trary to technocratic"closed"system building, a new generation of system 
builders created"open'or"post-modern'system building process in which 
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interested parties (e.g. the public, NGOs and regional and local govern- 
ment) were invited to participate. 2s
The recent evolution of Dutch water management is a case in point. As 
recently as the late 1960s the Rijkswaterstaat tended to flame the future as 
a simple extrapolation of the heroic past. Its policy memoranda envisaged 
ever more bold projects in hydraulic infrastructure. The opposition, which 
had been gaining momentum since the mid 1960s and which had gained 
broad popular support by the early 1970s, took the government engineers 
by surprise. In the popular view, the 'great builders' had become authori- 
tarian pillagers of water and land, agents of the devastating face of modern 
industrial civilisation. 
As in Hughes'examples, a number of planned projects uddenly ran into 
serious trouble. For instance, the fifth and last of the projected reclamation 
projects (the Markerwaard polder) in the enclosed Zuiderzee (the fourth 
had been completed in 1968) was already under way when the plan to situ- 
ate a second national airport here inspired a coalition of local NIMBY groups 
and well-established national environmental groups.The issue was put on the 
national political agenda, where environmental values as well as the grow- 
ing rift between government and citizens had become important concerns. 
The center-left government elected in 1974 was deeply committed to citizens' 
participation i  decision-making processes, and to deal with crises like the 
Markerwaard it established a new procedure.Thenceforth, construction projects 
of national importance would first have to run a gantlet of formal public hear- 
ings in which interested parties could air their views and objections. System 
builders like the Rijkswaterstaat had to hear several specialist commissions as 
well as interest groups and individual citizens. On the basis of the testi- 
mony, Parliament i self would come to a final decision. In the Markerwaard 
case, the Rijkswaterstaat's motives and options were deemed so politically 
unconvincing that to this day the project remains talled. 26 
The pace of system building slowed down considerably in the 1970s and 
1980s compared with the previous two decades, and there was widespread 
pessimism about the future of large-scale wet system building. But here 
too system building would revive. The closing of the Oosterschelde estuary 
became the main learning experience for a new approach to water man- 
agement in the 1980s and 1990s. 27 The Oosterschelde dam was to be the 
largest in the ambitious project o close off the South-Western Delta from 
the sea, a project enjoying broad popular support in the wake of a cata- 
strophic flood in 1953. It would also create a new freshwater basin, and 
therefore seal the fate of the prosperous mussel and oyster industry in the 
area. This led to serious discussions on alternatives. The Rijkswaterstaat, 
however, preferred the dam option for safety reasons and the function the 
new basin could play in the freshwater supply system. In the best techno- 
cratic style, the various interests were weighed, and it was conclude that a 
fixed dam was the best option. The disadvantaged parties--the mussel and 
oyster industry--were to be financially compensated. 
However this scenario derailed in mid-course. In the early 1970s fisher- 
men, biologists, pleasure craft owners, and national environmental groups 
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united in a renewed plea for an open Oosterschelde. As in the case of the 
Markerwaard, the question became a national issue. The national govern- 
ment appointed an independent committee to study the matter once again, 
in which-- in a radical departure from previous usage--civil engineers did 
not predominate and Rijkswaterstaat was not even represented. The com- 
mittee recommended a semi-permeable dam that would be closed only dur- 
ing storm surges, and Parliament agreed, pending proof of technical and 
financial feasibility. In the event, a rejuvenated Rijkswaterstaat managed to 
design such a dam: 66 huge caissons, 45 meters apart, support gigantic gates 
which can be lowered to sever the Oosterschelde from the sea during storm 
surges. The project was completed in 1986 and remains today the pride of 
Dutch hydraulic engineering. 28 The costs were high in financial terms; the 
Oosterschelde storm surge barrier cost twice as much as all the other works 
combined (some ten dams) in the South-Western Delta project. 
In the 1980s, this experiment with open system building, in which a 
number of interests were allowed to affect he design process, was formal- 
ized into a new doctrine of so-called integrated water management. A Min- 
isterial policy memorandum (1985) developed this concept explicitly as a 
technical and management solution to the complex multifunctionality of 
wet systems. 29 This principle was adopted and elaborated by Rijkswaterstaat 
in its Third Memorandum on Water Management (1989).3~ Integrated wa- 
ter management denoted on the one hand a systems approach to bodies of 
water, in which a variety of interests was translated into qualitative param- 
eters, which subsequently were quantified and related in a systems model. 
On the other hand, it denoted the administrative integration of heteroge- 
neous interests, responsibilities and organizations on several levels of ad- 
ministration. The entire gamut of user functions and users was to be included 
in the design process, but the decisive power was situated at water man- 
agement agencies. In this way, special interest groups were included in the 
process, but also in a sense pacified: the representation f their values within 
the system building regime was also a strategy to minimize the chance of 
massive political protests of the kind that had paralyzed wet system build- 
ing in the 1970s. 31 Thanks to the new regime of centrally coordinated, but 
relatively open system building, the 1990s again saw a revival of optimism 
and the framing of new large projects. These include a new'Delta plan'for 
large rivers in response to severe flooding in 1993 and 1995, and a novel 
type of storm surge barrier in the Nieuwe Waterweg, completed in 1997. 
The micropolit ics of design 
How, then, did system builders operate in these regimes? How did they 
embed potentially conflicting uses of water into the technological design 
of water works? In this section we shall present wo cases that have been 
investigated in detail in the research programme Technology in the Nether- 
lands during the 20 th Century. In the twentieth century, the increasing scale of 
wet system building made coordination between different functions increas- 
ingly critical: to use Perrow's phrase, water-based systems grew increasingly 
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tightly coupled. We shall focus on the historical era dominated by the re- 
gime of centralized and even technocratic system building, which shaped 
the background for more recent institutional discussions and developments 
as well as the actual hydraulic artefacts that constitute the material backbone 
of the current wet network. In this regime, as noted above, the engineers of
the Rijkswaterstaat were able to carry out complicated works in a relatively 
uncontested way, as they were regarded as the only qualified national experts 
and hence enjoyed relativepolitical autonomy and great popular espect. 
Canalizing the Meuse 
In the period 1918 to 1928, the Rijkswaterstaat canalized a portion of 
the River Meuse in the Province of Limburg. The engineers were aware 
that canalization entailed not only transforming the river as an artery of 
commerce, but also potentially transforming it as an artery of drainage. 
After canalization, drainage and transport systems would coexist intimately 
as different functions of the same physical human-built s ructure. Whether 
this could succeed without impeding transport or aggravating the chance 
of flooding depended chiefly on how the shipping locks and the large move- 
able weirs were designed. 
Around 1910 two major traditions of weir design had emerged. The first 
tradition utilized structures composed of numerous mall elements that 
could be manipulated by hand. The original inspiration was the "needle 
weir" invented in 1843 by Poir6e, an engineer of the French Ponts et 
Chaussees. Though such weirs were laborious to maintain, manage, and 
remove from the river in times of flood, they were capable of spanning 
almost any channel width and so were especially favored where naviga- 
tion required wide channels. 
The second tradition was emerging out of monolithic types of moveable 
weirs developed around the turn of the century, primarily by large German 
steel-construction firms seeking better-regulatable weirs for hydroelectric 
power plants. 32 These moveable weirs had only one or two very large move- 
able riveted steel elements, cylinders or gates with spans originally of around 
10 meters and by the late 1920s of up to 40 meters long, which could be 
lowered into the river or raised as needed to control discharge and maintain 
a particular water level. As modified for use in canalization projects, the new 
weirs had the advantage of rapid response times, cheapness of operation, 
reliability and simplicity of construction. These new types of weirs were made 
possible by revolutionary developments in teel construction, reinforced con- 
crete (for the fixed piers and beddings) and by the development of depend- 
able electrically powered rive mechanisms. It was clear to all that by 
comparison with the baroque complexities ofthe hand-powered older weir 
types, these new monolithic weirs were impeccably"modern." 
Canalization of the Dutch Meuse achieved political viability only after 
the development of state-run coal mines in the southern province of 
Limburg around the turn of the century. Details of the canalization project 
were worked out by a joint"Dutch-Belgian Commission for the Investiga- 
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tion of the Canalization of the Common Meuse.'The commission was ap- 
pointed in 1906 and submitted its final report in 1912. 33 International gree- 
ment was necessary because the Meuse formed a common border with 
Belgium for some 60 kin. It was quickly agreed that the new waterway 
should be dimensioned toRhine standards. This implied a navigable chan- 
nel width of at least 60 meters. 
Of course this ambitious nautical requirement could not be allowed to 
compromise the river's original drainage function. The two sets of criteria 
together implied a weir which could maintain prescribed navigational 
depths despite rapidly changing and highly variable river discharges and 
which in times of flood could be easily and reliably removed from the river 
in order to provide a navigational channel of 60 meters width and an un- 
obstructed ischarge. This suggests an impossible combination of the two 
traditions in weir design. However, while there was no way to fuse the 
small and big element traditions into one single weir opening, it was al- 
ready common practice to design hybrid weirs in which the different func- 
tions were performed by different types of weirs placed end-to-end across 
the river. Generally speaking, the small-element weirs were used in the 
"navigational channel" because they allowed for large openings between 
the weir abutments. The large-element weirs because of their accuracy were 
well suited to regulate discharge and were employed, sometimes in paral- 
lel, for this function. Their relative "agility"also meant hat the weir could 
effectively be "struck" in much less time than would be necessary if the 
weir will composed entirely of small elements. 
By the time of the Dutch Meuse canalization, it would in principle have 
been possible to use the new large weir elements in either the navigational 
opening, the discharge opening or both. However, given the stipulated 60m 
channel width, modern monolithic weir constructions with their maximum 
spans of at most 20-30 meters were ruled out for the navigational opening. 
In fact, the Commission explicitly recommended a variation of the tried 
and tested Poir6e system, with vertically moveable plates between the yokes 
instead of vertical needles. For the discharge openings, however, the com- 
mittee prized the large-element solution. 
A construction with large elements i  to be recommended in all respects for the 
discharge openings; these have to provide passage to discharges during small, 
often sudden increases inflow, to allow for the passage of ice-floes and floating 
objects, and consequently to have a means of closure which it is possible to 
regulate or remove under all possible conditions. 34
With the advent of World War I and the occupation of Belgium, the joint 
project fizzled. The (neutral) Dutch government proceeded with the part of 
the project downstream from the border Meuse. Instead of the 11 weir-lock 
complexes projected for the complete canalization, only four remained. The 
three upstream weirs were of the hybrid construction recommended bythe 
Joint Commission: a long chain of small elements closing off a 60 meter 
navigation opening joined to two or three 17 meter wide discharge openings 
closed off with single large elements--specifically, double Stoney-gates. 
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A weir too far? 
The final episode of the canalization project involving the design of the 
fourth, downstream, weir, is a perfect example of what was referred to above 
as the "technocratic-scientific" style of hydraulic engineering. The debate 
about he merits of different designs took place almost entirely within the 
confines of the Rijkswaterstaat bureaucracy, although the responsible min- 
ister intervened atcritical points. Different Rijkswaterstaat engineers were 
tacitly representing the different systems interests, rather than social groups 
acting through public forums like parliament or the newspapers. 
The fourth weir was projected at a site near the town of Grave where the 
Rijkswaterstaat was planning to replace the ferry by a new roadway bridge. 
This provided an opportunity to build a so-called"bridge w ir,'a construc- 
tion in which the weir elements were suspended on hinges from the bridge 
and could be removed by winching them up out of the water. This was a 
small-element type of weir developed in France in the 1870s. Given the 
bridge, such weirs were relatively cheap to build and they had proved ef- 
fective in long practice. Although the many small wheel-gates were more 
difficult to regulate than the big Stoney gates in the upstream weirs, the 
Grave weir did not demand such intensive regulation and it was not con- 
sidered necessary to build special regulative openings. The entire breadth 
of the navigational channel, i.e. 60 meters, would thus be spanned by a 
chain of small and quickly removable elements. 
The bridge weir was a preliminary design by the Meuse department of
the Rijkswaterstaat. Before funding, it had to be approved by the Minister of 
Public Works.This ame minister had only two weeks previously approved a 
new weir (at Borgharen, ear Maastricht) consisting of three large identical 
30 meter long wheel-gates. This decidedly modern structure had been de- 
signed and constructed in the workshops of the prestigious Dortmunder 
Union engineering works, at the behest of the Rijkswaterstaat's Juliana Ca- 
nal department. The weir was not part of the actual Meuse canalization and 
did not need to accomodate the very largest ships.That was why the 30 meter 
span was sufficient and why large elements could be employed. 
Nonetheless, the contrast between the modern design for the Borgharen 
weir and the antiquated design proposed for Grave was so glaring, that the 
minister felt compelled to call the competence of the Meuse department 
into question. Although that department's chief engineer energetically 
defended his proposed bridge-weir design--and also the 60 meter wide 
channel which would rule out large elements--his immediate superior 
thought otherwise and advised the minister accordingly. With dissension 
in the ranks about he optimum resolution of navigation and drainage re- 
quirements in the design of the weir, (and with Borgharen on his mind) 
the minister took his engineering corps to task: 
To my regret, I have not been able, while studying the various reports, to dis- 
abuse myself of the impression that the development of weir construction has 
been insufficiently followed by the Rijkswaterstaat ... and that the agency has 
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held fast to the small-element type of weir originally adopted for the Meuse 
canalization, without considering whether itmight not be desirable, given the 
technical progress that has been made, to abandon this typeY 
The controversy surrounding the Grave weir shows that superimposing 
different functional systems on the same wet substrate is not a question of 
following some recipe. Instead, perceptions judgements and conflicts are 
central. Requirements are not given, but are agonistically constructed by 
the system builders. 
The specific bone of contention in this case was that big elements facili- 
tate discharge functionality but tend to hinder shipping, while small ele- 
ments erve stringent navigational demands while compromising discharge 
safety and accuracy of regulation. So the fight between big and small ele- 
ments not only a fight between tradition and modernity, but also a fight 
between priority for shipping vs. drainage functions. Or to put it another 
way, between the river as a managed quasi-artificial e ement of the drain- 
age system and the river as an element of large international inland navi- 
gation system. 
Figure 1. Longitudinal Profile Meuse Canalisation. This figure (with a 
greatly exaggerated vertical axis) shows the 15 weir-lock complexes origi- 
nally programmed by the Dutch-Belgian Commission. Ultimately only com- 
plexes 11-15 were built, the other portion of the river being circumvented 
by a lateral canal. The succession of canal pounds is clearly visible. 
Figure 1 
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The nine lives of a protean systems node:The Haringvliet Sluices 
The second case spans two of the water management regimes noted 
above. It begins at the zenith of the technocratic regime as one of the 
projects in the post-war Delta Works and continues on into the phase of 
open post-modern system building. It exhibits the transition from an au- 
thoritarian regime in which nature was still regarded as an implacable n- 
emy to be subdued by all available means to a regime in which ecological 
concerns and political responsiveness became central values. 
As in the case of the Meuse canalization, this project to build a large 
sea-sluice in the joint mouth of the Rhine and the Meuse (the Haringvliet), 
shows that different wet systems can be superimposed on the same bodies 
of water without undue interference only thanks to careful design of the 
necessary hydraulic artifacts. In this case, the sluices were already manag- 
ing a number of different functions when, years later, they were called upon 
to assume a role in a reconstructed ecological system. Remarkably, the 
sluices required no structural alterations to perform this new function--a 
consequence of the flexibility that had been part of the original multipur- 
pose design. 
The construction of the sluices, part of the huge Delta Works project, 
was a direct response by the government and the Rijkswaterstaat to the 
severe storm of February 1, 1953 which had burst through the dikes around 
the southwestern estuaries in more than 100 places, killing some 1,800 
people. In the wake of this catastrophe, a plan was forged to close off all 
the Rhine and Meuse estuaries between the Rotterdam Waterway and the 
Westerschelde (see map). The aim was a dramatic reduction of the length 
of primary and vulnerable coastal dikes. An added benefit would be the 
creation of several large freshwater lakes to act as storage basins for irriga- 
tion and drinking water. However, this radical reconstruction of the delta 
threatened to conflict with its vital role in the national drainage system. 
The estuaries in question were also the mouths of major rivers. Although 
two undammed exits to the sea--the approaches to the harbors of Antwerp 
and Rotterdam--would remain, they could hardly cope with an ice-jammed 
Rhine or a rain-swollen Meuse in flood. 
Hence a large discharge opening was incorporated into one of the pro- 
posed dams. The natural candidate was the proposed Haringvliet dam across 
the common mouth of the Rhine and the Meuse. The sluice gates would be 
closed firmly at high tide to keep salt water out and open at low tide in 
order to let excess river water flow out to sea. 
Other functions also loomed large in the design of the sluices. For one 
thing the location of the proposed sluice enabled it to be used as a kind of 
giant valve to regulate the apportionment of Rhine water between the 
Rotterdam Waterway and the Haringvliet. In essence, the tidal sluice, by 
dint of proper design, could also function as a weir to regulate upstream 
water levels. Manipulating the weir's regime at low tide and hence regu- 
lating the water level in the Haringvliet would make the route to the 
Rotterdam waterway more or less"inviting"for runoff from the Rhine/Meuse 
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and hence determine the amount of water flowing past Rotterdam to the 
sea. Being able to manage this flow was an important tool in fighting the 
increasing salinity of the Waterway caused by its continual enlargement in 
the service of shipping. The advancing"salt-tongue"threatened he fresh 
water supply situation all along the Waterway, from irrigation for the vul- 
nerable greenhouse farming region of the"Westland,'to R tterdam's mu- 
nicipal water supply. By ensuring a minimal fresh water flow, sufficient 
counterpressure could be maintained to keep the salt-tongue at bay. 
On the other hand, of course, too much water would hinder shipping 
because of excessive currents. Hence, the Haringvliet"weir'also had to be 
able to manage the full flow of the Rhine and Meuse in flood. In other 
words, the"weir"--like the Meuse weirs further upstream--had to be com- 
pletely removable so as to restore the full cross-section of the sea-sluice. 
This multifunctionality of the Haringvliet sluice is reflected in its design, 
the result of several years of sometimes acerbic debate within the 
Rijkswaterstaat. The main design criteria were robustness and reliability 
on the one hand, and discharge capacity and regulability on the other. Given 
the tradeoffs between discharge capacity (for which large openings were 
required) and robustness, finding an optimal solution was no easy task. 
Among the many possible options for closure elements, the choice finally 
fell on segment gates, i.e. gates supported on long arms that pivoted verti- 
cally around a point. (see figure: cross-section Haringvliet sluices) These 
were considered to have a number of structural and operational advan- 
tages, in particular, ease of raising and lowering even when loaded by 
large water-level differences. Inview of the critical role of the sluice, both as an 
element of the coastal defense system and as an element of the fresh water 
supply system, itwas thought essential that per sluice opening each of the two 
segments be a fully functional back-up for the other. This is the main reason 
for the apparently symmetrical construction of the sluice, with one segment 
facing seaward and one facing land-inward. On closer inspection the sluice is 
not perfectly symmetrical. For one thing, the seaward gate is somewhat lower 
than the landward one. The idea is a kind of division of mechanical stress 
between the two gates when the sluice is being impacted by gale-driven 
waves. The height of the seaward gate is such that the largest waves will 
break over this gate. That portion of the wave spilling over the seaward 
gate will be stopped by the landward gate. Hence each gate takes part of 
the burden. Nonetheless, the gates are so designed that even if one should 
fail, the other could hold the fort until repairs are made. 
Looking at the sluice as a weir for retaining fresh water coming from 
upstream, the segment gates similarly back each other up. Either of the 
gates can be raised from its sill the requisite amount in order to regulate 
outflow and hence the water level of the Haringvliet.This i  a complex matter, 
given the constantly changing tidal patterns at sea and the highly variable 
river discharges. Hence, from its commissioning in 1970, the sluice-gates have 
been computer-controlled. Each of the 34 gates can be independently raised 
or lowered in order to achieve the desired water level in the Haringvliet 
given expected rates of upstream discharge and the tidal situation. 
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Figure 2 
Cross section Haringvliet sluices 
l 
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Hydraulic artifacts may also be enrolled into"dry" systems, particularly 
as means to cross rivers and canals. We have seen this already in the case 
of the weir at Grave, on the Meuse. The Haringvliet dam was also ear- 
marked as an element of a coastal highway which incorporated several of 
the other Delta dams into its route as well. This additional requirement 
influenced the design of the triangularly shaped reinforced concrete beam 
which forms the structural heart of the sluice construction. So the total 
Haringvliet dam as designed is a wondrous point of intersection of at least 
five different systems, four of them water-based: rainage, freshwater dis- 
tribution, inland navigation, coastal defense, and roadway transport. 
The ecological turn and post-modern system building 
In 1970 the Haringvliet dam went into service. The Haringvliet estuary 
turned fresh within a matter of weeks and a massive biological transfor- 
mation of the entire region ensued. Salt water species died off and were 
replaced by a much more limited range of freshwater species. Especially 
hard hit were all kinds of tidewater and salt-marsh species which had 
thrived in the marshes and on the sandbanks of the estuary. It should be 
noted that at the time at least some Rijkswaterstaat engineers were quite 
aware of these environmental effects, but that they could not be seriously 
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considered, given the huge safety and water management interests driving 
the construction of the dam and the sluices. Ecological concerns would 
have compromised these primary interests and were hence not represented 
in the technocratic regime. A 1955 conference on the Delta works con- 
cluded: 
Safety absolutely demands the closure of the estuaries. In exchange a certain 
loss of our natural possessions must be accepted. But what is lost is no small 
thing. The dynamic haracter of the Delta region will be lost, possibly not en- 
tirely but certainly in large part. At most places tidal effects and saline gradients 
will inevitably be eliminated. In any case the three most important regions, the 
Oosterscbelde, the Haringvliet and the Biesbosch will be totally transformed. 
The consequence is that the bulk of the Delta planning region is facing a 
strong biological impoverishment. Numerous plant and animal species and even 
more unique combinations of species will be forever lost. The consequences 
will probably be even more extensive than we can now oversee. It is not un- 
likely that, even years hence, we will be facing unexpected problems. 1 
The past 15 years have witnessed an ecological turn in Dutch water man- 
agement along with a turn to"post-modern" system building as described 
above. With this has come a determination to try to undo as much of the 
ecological damage as possible. This has posed a new challenge to the 
Haringvliet sluices. Now, aside from its many other functions it is being 
called upon to serve as an instrument of ecological restoration. The inher- 
ent flexibility of its programmable gates, which makes it possible to devise 
any combination of flows seaward or land-inward, has given life to the 
idea of restoring at least something of the original tidal and estuarine na- 
ture of the Haringvliet. What management  regime to choose depends 
on reassessing the importance of the various system functions per- 
formed by the Haringvliet sluices. Ecological reconstruction is now in 
any case a political priority even if this means seriously compromising 
other functions--except, in extremis, safety. The"open"po l icy -making 
process around this project has resulted in an ironically inverted envi- 
ronmental  impact statement. Instead of assessing the damage done to 
nature by some human project or practice, the study is assessing what 
damage will be done to existing infrastructure by the reinstatement of a 
partially saline environment in the Haringvliet. The study involves assess- 
ing the expected amage at four different levels of ecological reconstruc- 
tion for existing human-made systems like fresh water distribution, inland 
transportation, coastal defenses, and drainage. Technological and social 
"fixes" for these damages are identified, and recommendations are made 
regarding the level of ecological reconstruction that can be financially jus- 
tified. In the midst of this multi-dimensional"open"system building pro- 
cess, the protean Haringvliet sluices remain unchanged, ready for their 
enrollment in the maintenance of yet another human-made large quasi- 
natural system--in this case the artificial ecology of a saline Haringvliet 
"estuary." 
38 Knowledge, Technology, & Policy ! Winter 2002 
Outlook: The wet  network and the LTS-field 
We have seen how the balancing of potentially conflicting interests was 
accommodated in different regimes of system building characteristic for 
different periods of time. We also analyzed in some detail how multiple 
uses were translated into multifunctional design during the era of wet tech- 
nocratic system building. Thus we hope to provide a background setting 
for current debates on participation and globalisation i water manage- 
ment. 
By way of conclusion, we can reflect back onto the body of LTS research, 
the sub-field in technology studies that specializes in sociological nd his- 
torical perspectives on the development of infrastructural technologies. We 
have demonstrated that the notion of"large technical systems"can beuse- 
fully extended to such supposedly oosely coupled systems as those orga- 
nizing the social management  and uses of water. Moreover, we 
demonstrated that a broadening of the concept of"system building"from 
the perceptions and actions of individuals to the place of possibly compet- 
ing organizations in regimes enables the study of the delicate politics of 
wet system building. 
We can now position water-based systems in the overall classification of
large technical systems. In his typology of large infrastructural systems (the 
most comprehensive typology in the LTS literature of which we are aware 2), 
Kaijser characterizes systems by their function (energy supply, communi- 
cation, transport) and the type of networks they use. For instance, (rail)road 
systems and electricity supply systems use artificial, human-built networks. 
By contrast, radio, air traffic and water transport systems use 'natural' net- 
works in the shape of water or air. In our study of water-based large tech- 
nical systems (LTS) within the Netherlands, however, we find both 
distinctions challenged. Thus, the physical networks of such systems con- 
sist of network links like canals, (normalized) rivers, lakes and estuaries and 
network nodes in the form of hydraulic artefacts. From this perspective, water- 
based LTS are natural-technical hybrids. In addition, the same wet network 
link can be used for a variety of functions. These include inland navigation, 
drainage, flood control, fresh water supply to cities, agriculture and industry, 
and--for a large part of Dutch history--military defence by creating"wa- 
terlines"to bar foreign invaders. In sum, in terms of functions water-based 
systems are hybrids too--they are multifunctional systems. 
From these characteristics follow several properties of wet LTSs. Kaijser 
has observed how systems with artificial networks are expensive and gen- 
erally develop slowly. Natural systems, by contrast, can be set up rather 
fast and cheaply as the network linkages do not have to be constructed. 
From this hybrid character it follows that in the case of water-based LTS, 
some parts of the system can be accomplished quickly and easily (mobiliz- 
ing rivers for transport), while others are extremely abor and money in- 
tensive (like the construction of canals or large dams). 
Also, the technique of coupling between different large technical sys- 
tems may differ. Kaijser distinguished coupling by"junctions"and by"gate- 
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way technologies."Road, rail and air transport networks are coupled in the  
junction of the airport. Likewise, gas pipes, warm water pipes for town 
heating, and the electricity grid meet in the gas-fired combined heat and 
power plant. The container is a gateway technology to connect different 
transport systems, just like converters couple direct current and alternat- 
ing current in electricity supply systems studied by Hughes.  3 Looking at 
our water-based systems, we can add a third kind of coupling to Kaijser's 
typology: different functional systems uch as inland navigation, fresh wa- 
ter supply and drainage may share not only junctions (like sluices) or gate- 
way technologies (like ships), but also the same material network- l inks 
(like a piece of normalized river performing all three functions). Obviously 
this intimate type of coupling makes the problem of coordinating the dif- 
ferent functions even more compelling. 
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